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Abstract
Performance-based ﬁnancing becomes a common strategy to improve health sector quality.
The ﬁndings of this paper imply that performance-based ﬁnancing should take motivational
eﬀects and levels of provider capacity into account. Using a ﬁeld experiment in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, we ﬁnd that ﬁnancial incentives led to more eﬀort from health workers
on rewarded activities, without deterring eﬀort on non-rewarded activities. We also ﬁnd a
shift from intrinsic to extrinsic motivation. Finally, the increased eﬀort by health workers
proved unsuccessful and led to a reduction in revenue, suggesting that health workers lacked
the capacity to develop appropriate strategies to perform.
JEL Codes: H52, 015, I21, I28
1 Introduction
Long-standing concerns about the cost, accessibility and quality of health services have raised a
growing interest in ﬁnancial incentives for medical care providers. Performance-based ﬁnancing
(PBF) is a mechanism by which health facilities are, at least partially, funded on the basis on
their production of a pre-determined output. It is a central idea in economics that incentives
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encourage eﬀort and thus performance in the context of a classic agency problem: to produce a
desired outcomes - better health in the population - a principal entity -the government- provides a
reward conditional on the agent -health workers- achieving a performance - treating patients - by
undertaking a set of actions - speciﬁc eﬀorts to attract patients. The reward should reinforce health
workers' willingness to achieve the rewarded actions (motivational crowd-in eﬀect), as it is often
the case for employees in the industry (see Lazear, 2000). However, psychologists have argued for a
long time that contingent rewards may actually be negative reinforcers (Lepper et al. (1973), Deci
(1975), Deci and Ryan (1985), among others), especially when employees have high initial levels of
intrinsic motivation, i.e. when pride in one's work is high and the activity is interesting (motivational
crowd-out eﬀect). An additional concern is the fact that agents may concentrate their eﬀort on
the actions attached to the reward at the expense of other actions that might be important as well
in producing the ultimate output (substitution eﬀect)1. Moreover, when PBF rewards collective
rather than individual performances, it may induce a reduction in overall eﬀort and/or change in
within-group eﬀort allocation due to free-riding considerations (free-riding eﬀect). Finally, larger
incentives were found counterproductive compared to smaller ones (Ariely et al., 2009), suggesting
that incentives may induce negative stress and that increased motivation may not lead to increased
performance (underachievement eﬀect). The underachievement eﬀect is particularly observed when
the task is diﬃcult and requires some form of creative thinking (Glucksberg, 1962). Since PBF
targets performances that are output like the number of patients, rather than input like attendance
or technical quality, it requires that health workers develop appropriate strategies and invest in the
appropriate inputs to increase the output. The task is thus more diﬃcult that rewards contingent on
a speciﬁc input2: Loevinsohn and Harding (2005) suggest that providers may not possess adequate
ability to innovate and change health-seeking behavior if they lack human capital.
This paper makes several contributions. First, even though performance-related payment mod-
els have been implemented in many developed and developing countries with the hope of improving
the eﬃciency of the public health sector (see Figure 1 for the implementation of PBF in subsa-
harian Africa), the scientiﬁc evidence on its impact remains thin. This paper constitutes the ﬁrst
randomized study using the random assignment of a large number of health areas on the eﬀects of
1This reallocation of attention away from other tasks was developed by Holmström and Milgrom (1991) as the
multitasking problem.
2Two studies provide evidence that rewards contingent on a speciﬁc input (respectively attendance and service
quality) do motivate health workers to provide more of this input (at least in the short run), but did not lead to any
increase in health service utilization (the output) (Banerjee and Duﬂo, 2008; Peabody et al., 2011).
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a performance-based mechanism as a way to allocate public resources in the health sector. Second,
since performance plays a central and sensitive role in this type of intervention, the study elaborates
on measures of performance that are impervious to gaming. Finally, it provides a comprehensive
view on the eﬀects of PBF, including its motivational and substitution eﬀects in addition to the
eﬀect on performances, which is a novelty in the empirical literature on PBF in developing countries.
Until 2011, the studies of the impact of PBF did not use credible comparison groups: they
compare very small groups (generally 2-3 districts) which were not randomly assigned to the diﬀerent
treatments (Soeters, 2011; Rusa et al., 2009; Soeters et al., 2005; Eicher et al., 2007; Soeters and
Griﬀths, 2003; Forsberg, 2001), or the situation before and after the introduction of PBF (Sondorp
et al., 2008; Eicher et al., 2007; Meessen et al., 2007). The vast majority of the papers advocate that
PBF improves accountability, eﬃciency, quality and quantity of service delivery (see Loevinsohn
and Harding (2005) and Eichler and Levine (2009) for an overview). However, the interference of
confounding factors and the fact that is often not possible to isolate the eﬀects of ﬁnancial incentives
from other elements3 make the question of the impact of PBF largely unanswered (Christianson et
al. (2008), Eldridge and Palmer (2009), Oxman and Fretheim (2009)). Olken et al. (2012) reports
on an experiment using a PBF mechanism to improve the eﬃcacy of a grant program to village
committees in Indonesia. Since the PBF mechanism was applied to village committees rather than
health workers, this program tests how incentivized village committee members could monitor health
workers rather than the direct eﬀect of incentive on health worker behavior4. Basinga et al. (2011)
conducted a quasi-experimental study on the eﬀect of PBF on use and quality of health services
that is the closest to our study. The study took place in Rwanda and combines randomization and a
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence strategy in order to control for potential selection eﬀects5. It ﬁnds that PBF
is an eﬃcient way to increase health service utilization of some of the targeted services and targeted
health outcomes (Basinga et al. (2011), De Walque et al. (2013)), as well as worker productivity
(Gertler and Vermeesch, 2013). However, the study does not inform about the eﬀects of PBF on
3PBF has commonly been a part of a package that may include increased funding, technical support, training,
changes in management, and new information systems. In most studies, the level of resources allocated to the health
facilities in diﬀerent treatments is not similar, as well as the level of technical supervision and information system.
4For the incentivized village committees, 20% of the grant depended on the relative performance of the village
with respect to a set of educational and health outcomes. The study ﬁnds that the incentive led to an increase in
health workers' attendance, better health outcomes, and an absence of negative spillovers on untargeted outcomes.
5166 facilities were grouped into 8 pairs and one side of each pair was randomly assigned to pay-for-performance
funding, while the other side continued with the traditional input-based funding until 23 months after study baseline.
The paper uses a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence strategy in order to control for potential selection eﬀects since the number
of units of randomization was very small and some post-randomization reassignment of some districts happened
because of administrative boundaries' reorganization.
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the provision of non-targeted services (substitution eﬀect), and it does not provide direct evidence
on motivational eﬀects. To conclude, the literature on the eﬀect of PBF on health outcomes is
still limited due to the small number of studies providing clean identiﬁcation of the impact of the
incentive, and due to the lack of evidence on motivational and substitution eﬀects in developing
countries6 (Miller and Babiarz, 2013).
This paper presents the ﬁndings of a research project conducted in the Haut-Katanga district
of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) between 2009 and 2013 to study the eﬀect of a PBF
approach compared to a ﬁxed payment approach. The 96 health areas present in the Haut-Katanga
district were randomly assigned to performance-based or ﬁxed payments, while ensuring that the
same amount of governmental resources was allocated to each group to neutralize the ressource
eﬀect. In this study, the PBF mechanism was based on a point system where the number of
points was determined by the number of patients for 7 services (plus 3 additional services for
referral facilities), relative to all PBF-group facilities. The two mechanisms have been in place
from June 2010 to September 2012. Administrative data was collected throughout the project,
spotchecks of health workers' attendance were performed in July, August and September 2012,
and a ﬁnal independent survey was administered from December 2012 to Feburary 2013 -after the
incentives have been withdrawn. The objective of this research was to provide evidence on the
eﬀects of the performance-based payment on (i) the supply of and prices of health services, (ii)
health workers' work-related stress and motivation, (iii) service utilization, and (iv) the population
health status. The analysis distinguishes targeted and non-targeted services in order to check
for the potential substitution eﬀect of incentives. It is important to note that there are many
diﬀerent PBF approaches (see Miller and Barbiaz (2013) for a review). In this study, the design
of the performance-based strategy was kept simple so that it could be feasibly implemented in the
diﬃcult conditions of DRC. Consequently, the strategy lacked some of the more technically complex
attributes that might be seen in other PBF interventions, especially stringent quality measures tied
to performance payments. The payment was only conditional on the number of patients for some
pre-determined services. The results should thus be considered as speciﬁc to this particular PBF
approach, although we refer to it in the rest of the paper as PBF for simplicity.
This study ﬁnds that the introduction of the ﬁnancial incentives in the treatment group led
6The literature is more developed in the context of high income countries, although identiﬁcation issues also
limit the scope of many studies. For instance, Mullen, Franck and Rosenthal (2010) use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
strategy on US data and show that pay-for-performance did not lead to any major improvement in quality nor notable
substitution eﬀect of non-rewarded services for rewarded ones.
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to concrete changes in health workers behaviors. Health workers made more eﬀort to attract
patients: (1) they were found to be present at facilities more often; (2) fees for targeted services
were signiﬁcantly reduced; (3) the health workers organized more preventive health sessions at
facilities; (4) the health workers conducted more community-based outreach activities to sensitize
the population about the services oﬀered by the facility. Overall, the ﬁnancial incentives induced
an intensiﬁcation of eﬀort to increase utilization of targeted health services. Equally important,
the evaluation found that the increased eﬀort invested in the targeted services did not happen
at the expense of the eﬀort invested in the non-targeted services: there were no substitution of
non-rewarded activities for rewarded ones. Also, although the reward was contingent on service
volumes, it did not have a negative eﬀect on service quality (which did not increase neither).
Surprisingly, the increased eﬀort did not led to any change in utilization of health services
by the population, which echoes the argument by Glucksberg (1962) or Ariely et al. (2009) that
increased motivation may not lead to increased performance. It is crucial to think about the barriers
that impede the increase in utilization of health services and were not addressed in the strategies
implemented by the incentivized health workers, such as the lack of awareness about the beneﬁt
of health care services, or the general dissatisfaction with the quality of care. This result suggests
that health workers did not develop innovative actions able to stimulate the demand for health
services, which is arguably not an easy task in a context where people are generally low educated
and uninformed about modern medicine. As facilities in the treatment group reduced the prices of
their services more than comparison facilities without attracting more patients, there was less total
revenue in these facilities (42% less), even though the two groups received the same subsidy payment
level from the government. Consequently, the ﬁnancial incentive payment mechanism resulted in
a 34% reduction in staﬀ revenues, and in a reduction in health worker job satisfaction. The lower
levels of job satisfaction might be due to the fact that an increase in eﬀort led to a reduction in
income, or to the exposure to the incentive itself. Our study cannot disentangle between these two
explanations.
Finally, an important result is that staﬀ attendance, which was found higher in the incentivized
health facilities than in the comparison facilities when the incentives were in place, was found
lower few months after the incentives were withdrawn. Also, the previously incentivized health
workers were found to attach more importance on job material beneﬁts relatively to non-material
beneﬁts than non-incentivized health workers. We show that these eﬀects are not attributable to
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the decrease in worker income, suggesting that incentive-based payments deterred some of staﬀ
intrinsic motivation.
There are key policy implications of our ﬁndings for governments considering PBF as a way to
allocate public ressources to the health sector. First, PBF increases health worker overall motivation
without deterring service quality or non-rewarded services, meaning that health workers are strategic
but not cynical so that they would swap non-rewarded actions for rewarded ones. However, two
types of precaution should be considered. First, contingent rewards might reduce the intrinsic
component of health worker motivation so incentives should be used as a permanent instrument
otherwise it would backﬁre. Second, our results suggest that contingent rewards might not be
appropriate when the task is diﬃcult and requires sophisticated strategies, because incentivized
agents provided more-of-the-same eﬀort but did not develop novel ideas to reach complicated goals.
The translation of motivation into performance may thus be better in contexts where the rewarded
task is easy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical back-
ground. Section 3 presents the context in which the experiment was set up and the experimental
design. Section 4 examines the data and econometric approach. Section 5 presents the eﬀects of
PBF compared to a ﬁxed payment approach, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Background
In this section, we consider a simple framework that provides some structure to the ﬁndings in the
literature that extrinsic rewards may backﬁre (Glucksberg (1962), Deci (1971), Lepper et al. (1973),
Deci and Ryan (1985), Kohn (1993), Ariely et al. (2009), among others). The motivation for this
section is to show that reasonable assumptions on workers' behavior, diﬀerent from informational
and reputational eﬀects, are able to produce predictions consistent with the evidence found in the
literature.
Let's consider that an agent engages into a certain task if and only if her interest in the activity
is larger than the cost of undertaking the activity c. If the agent succeeds in producing the output,
her beneﬁt in the activity is two-fold: the intrinsic value that the agent attributes to the output,
V , and a contingent reward b. If she does not succeeds the beneﬁt is zero, and the probability that
she succeeds if she undertakes the activity is her ability θ. Her utility of engaging into the activity
is thus given by U = θ(V + b)− c. Holding everything else equal, the reward b therefore increases
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the probability that the agent engages into the activity.
Benabou and Tirole (2003)'s framework provides an explanation of why rewards may be counter-
productive during the period when incentives are in place in presence of information assymmetries:
rewards from a knowledgeable principal may inform a more ignorant agent about the diﬃculty of the
task c, or about her ability to succeed in the task θ, or even about the intrinsic value of the task V 7.
These informational eﬀects of rewards have a negative impact on agent utility which might be large
enough to oﬀset the positive impact of θb. Moreover, the permanent nature of informational eﬀect
makes the eﬀect on motivation also permanent after incentives have been withdrawn. Benabou
and Tirole (2006) adds another explanation of why extrinsic rewards might crowd out agent's eﬀort
during the period when incentives are in place due to the idea that an agent concerned by social
reputation or self-respect concerns might want to reduce her eﬀort in response to the introduction
of extrinsic rewards in order to signal her intrinsic motives. As Gneezy et al. (2011) summarizes,
economists think about the eﬀects of incentives on behavior in terms of information and signaling.
However, the literature suggests that informational and reputational eﬀects are unlikely to drive
all situations where rewards backﬁre. For instance in Deci (1971), Zeevi (1971) or Lepper et al.
(1973), students who are oﬀered external rewards for performing at some tasks like solving a serie
of puzzles or art activity are less likely to engage into these tasks after the external reward has been
withdrawn. The authors do not ﬁnd evidence that they feel less able to perform or ﬁnd the task more
diﬃcult, but they ﬁnd that students express less interest in the task itelf. The explanation through
information asymmetries does not ﬁt well with these observations because it sounds unlikely that
the students learned much about the diﬃculty of the puzzles, or their ability to perform the puzzles,
or the intrinsic value of solving puzzles. In such contexts where information assymmetries seem
small or non-existent, the decrease in motivation after the reward was withdrawn should be found
somewhere else. In fact, the authors point to the fact that the introduction of extrinsic motives
causes a shift in attention from the value that the agent attributes to the output V in favor of the
external beneﬁt b. Actions perceived as ends in the absence of external motives tend to become
means when external rewards are introduced (Lepper et al. 1982). Deci and Ryan (1985) argues
that rewards change the locus of control from internal to external and make agents bored, alienated
and reactive rather than proactive. Kohn (1993) notes that rewards make people less enthousiatic
about their behaviour. Overall, what psychologists term the overjustiﬁcation eﬀect is compatible
7Individuals may have imperfect memory why they engaged in the task. Note that in this case there is no need
for the principal to have information that the agent does not have. It is just information that the agent had and lost.
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with situations where principals and agents have similar information about agent's ability or the
diﬃculty and intrinsic value of the task to start with, but agents pay less attention to the intrinsic
value of the task after they were oﬀered extrinsic rewards.
We thus propose (and test in our empirical analysis) an alternative habit-forming based theory
of motivation by introducing a parameter α reﬂecting the attention paid to the extrinsic beneﬁt
from the task b, and a parameter β reﬂecting the attention paid to its intrinsic value V . Total
motivation is given by: U = θ((βV + αb) − c where α and β reﬂect weights attached to extrinsic
versus intrinsic motives in agent's utility. Our framework is based on two key assumptions: (1) First,
β = f(α) with f
′
(.) ≤ 0, which stands for the idea that people have limited attention in the sense
that more attention paid on extrinsic motives can only decrease attention paid on intrinsic ones,
or do nothing. (2) Second, attention is prone to habit-forming: as soon as attention is drawn on a
motive, it remains permanently because people don't forget. For example, an awareness campaign
that would draw agent's attention to the intrinsic value of the task would shift β from 0 to a positive
value. Similarly, the introduction of a ﬁnancial remuneration for succeeding at the task would shift
α from 0 to a positive value. Then the levels of V and b are likely to vary over time depending on
new information, experience, principal's decisions etc., but agent's attention paid on intrinsic and
extrinsic motives cannot disappear. Attention parameters α and β evolve over time only through
the relationship β = f(α) in contexts where attention is limited (f non constant).
Under this framework, post-reward motivation is smaller than pre-reward one if and only if
f
′
< 0. The mechanism is as follows:
Before Exposure to Extrinsic Rewards The agent has never received any extrinsic reward
for engaging into the task (b = 0), and therefore she does not pay attention to extrinsic motives
(α = 0). The utility of engaging into the activity is U0 = θf(0)V − c.
During Exposure to Extrinsic Rewards The principal introduces an extrinsic reward b > 0,
and the agent pays a level of attention α > 0 to the reward. The utility of engaging into the activity
is now U1 = θ(f(α)V +αb)−c. Since α > 0, f(α) < f(0) and U1 can be both smaller or larger than
U0 depending on the size of the increase in motivation due to the new extrinsic reward αb relative
to the loss in motivation due to the shift of attention paid on intrinsic motives (f(0) − f(α))V .
Typically small rewards in contexts where intrinsic motives are large would decrease the total
motivation, while large rewards in contexts where intrinsic motives are small would increase the
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total motivation.
After Exposure to Extrinsic Rewards The principal stops providing the agent with rewards
(b is back to 0). However, attention parameters remain the same because attention is prone to
habit-forming, and the utility of engaging into the activity is now: U2 = θf(α)V − c. U2 is smaller
than U1 if and only if α > 0, meaning exposure to extrinsic reward in the previous period eﬀectively
drew agent's attention on extrinsic motives. Moreover, U2 is smaller than U0 if and only if f
′
< 0,
meaning agent's attention is limited.
In a context of unlimited attention (f
′ ≡ 0), the introduction of an extrinsic reward would attract
some new attention from the agent without decreasing pre-existing attention paid to the intrinsic
value of the task V . After the extrinsic reward is withdrawn, pre-existing attention paid to V would
remain intact and motivation would be back at its pre-reward level, without any detrimental eﬀect
on later motivation.
In the empirical part of the paper, we test this theoretical framework by eliciting the relative
size of α and β and comparing agents who have been exposed to extrinsic reward (the performance-
based ﬁnancing system) and people who have not. A testable prediction is that α should be larger
and β smaller among the former than the latter. We also provide evidence on the comparison
between U0, U1 and U2.
Finally, rewards may backﬁre not because of reduced motivation, but because increased moti-
vation is accompanied by reduced performance. There are two main explanations for the reduced
performance. One is the multitask interpretation proposed in Hölmstrom and Milgrom (1991)
where agents focus on the rewarded actions at the expense of other actions that might be necessary
complement to perform well, which we refer to as a substitution eﬀect8. Second, Glucksberg (1962)
and Ariely et al. (2009) observe that people who are oﬀered a reward for performing at some tasks
perform better at simple tasks but worse at tasks calling for -even rudimentary- cognitive skills,
indicating that rewards generate negative stress limiting one's creative thinking (Baumeister, 1984).
In this case, lower ability is associated with larger rewards (θ′(b) < 0) not because the agent infers
that his ability is lower than expected, but because larger rewards constitutes larger stakes and
larger stress which narrows the mind and reduce ability to perform (Kamenica, 2012). McGraw
and McCullers (1979) explains that reward leads to underachievement when the task requires open-
8For instance, increased use of prenatal visits might not lead to a reduction in child mortality if mothers do fewer
postnatal visits
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minded thinking because the focus of attention limits one's capacity to draw unusual connections
between elements. Under negative stress, the agent initially provides more eﬀort and yet produces
a smaller output9. In other words, U is larger but a change in the content of the eﬀort makes it
less productive. One example would be a student whose motivation in passing her exam gets larger
due to the promise of a gift conditional on passing, who would spend hours and hours reading
her lessons without being able to learn because her mind would be distracted. In the context of
health workers exposed to ﬁnancial rewards, the phenomena may show itself through motivated
but stressed out workers who would be more tense, less staid with patients, or would decrease time
spent with the patients in order to consult more of them, etc.
All in all, the theory leaves thus room for both positive and negative eﬀects of ﬁnancial incentives
on both workers' eﬀort and performance, making the question empirical in essence.
3 Experimental Set-Up
3.1 Background on Health in DRC and Haut-Katanga
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is the second largest country in Africa by area, with the
fourth largest population at 66 million (World Bank, 2012). It is also among the poorest countries
in the world: the country is ranked second from the bottom of the Human Development Index (186
out of 187 in 2012) (UNDP, 2012), with an estimated per capita income of US$ 220 (current) in
2012 (World Bank, 2012). Impoverished by decades of war, instability and bad governance, it is
not surprising that DRC is not on track to reach the health-related MDGs. Since the democratic
elections in 2006, the country has started a slow reconstruction phase and a decentralization process,
with the election of provincial governments, including provincial ministers of health. Developing
and putting in place eﬀective service delivery models such as Performance-based Financing (PBF)
is be a strategy for improving health outcomes among the population.
The district of Haut-Katanga entails 1.26 million people in the province of Katanga in the
south-eastern corner of the DRC. From September to November 2009, a survey was conducted in
order to better understand the health situation in Haut-Katanga by providing a description of the
functioning of the health facilities as well as the characteristics and behavior of the health workers,
patients and households in the region. The survey sample entailed 152 health facilities (5% referral
9After some periods, the agent may observe that her eﬀort is de facto not as much productive as expected as
adjust her eﬀort accordingly.
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centers, 71% health centers and 24% health posts)10. Descriptive statistics from this survey can be
viewed in Appendix Table 4. This survey indicated that the initial situation of the health facilities
in Haut-Katanga was worrying not primarily because of the coverage for basic health services but
rather because of the poor quality of health services. Indeed, as for coverage for health services,
the ratio of health workers to total population was quite good with 1 health worker for every 1860
individuals11, meaning that staﬃng was not the main issue in Haut-Katanga. Accessibility of health
facilities was also pretty good: 87% patients live at 10km or less and 70% spent less than an hour
to come to the facility.
However, the poor quality of infrastructure was striking: only one out of four facilities had access
to a water tap, the same for electricity. The majority had only low-cost basic equipment. One health
worker out of four did not receive any ﬁxed wage from the health facility. As a consequence, the
typical health worker earned 61% of his income from the health facility, while 39% from other
jobs and/or agricultural production. However, health workers spent 52 hours per week working in
the health facility. They received 35 patients the week before the survey, which means that each
health worker received about 7 patients per working day, so health workers were not overworked and
should spend some time waiting for patients to come. Patients reported quite short consultation
time (16 minutes on average), and twice as much waiting time before the consultation (30 minutes
on average)12. 56% of patients had to pay a fee for the service, although the median fee for a visit
was quite low 800FC (0.88$).
In this survey, the health status of the population was found preoccupying: 25% of the sample
had been sick in the last four weeks, with malaria and diarrhea being the most prevalent diseases.
Concerning maternal health, 31% of births in the last 12 months were not attended in a formal
health facility. Mothers utilized more prenatal than postnatal health services: 76% of women
pregnant in the last 12 months had at least one prenatal visit while only 10% attended a postnatal
visit. However, only a third of prenatal visits included the minimum tests, according to women's
recall. Despite frequent immunization campaigns, only 13% of children under 5 years-old were able
to present an immunization card (although based on mother's declaration a majority of children
got immunized at least once). Finally, we found low exposure to prevention campaigns other than
immunization, with around two thirds of the households never exposed to any HIV prevention,
10161 health facilities were recognized as part of the government health system in the district, among which 5
hospitals were excluded from the study and 4 health centers could not be reached.
11The ministry of health considers that there should be at least one health worker for every 1500 individuals.
12This survey did not allow for assessing the technical quality of medical procedure.
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child nutrition, or maternal health campaign.
3.2 Experimental Design
Payment Calculation
In Haut-Katanga district, the 96 health areas (totalizing 152 health facilities) were randomly as-
signed to one of two payment systems. In the ﬁxed payment group, the amount allocated to each
facility was calculated based on the staﬀ in the facility: a list of eligible workers was established at
the beginning of the pilot by the Ministry of Health. Each worker was entitled to a given amount
of governmental payment depending on his/her grade and experience. In contrast, payments to the
PBF health facilities were to be made after veriﬁcation of declared service volumes by facilities.
The targeted services included seven services at the primary care level (outpatient ﬁrst curative
consultations, prenatal consultations, deliveries, obstetric referral, children completely vaccinated,
tetanus toxoid vaccination, and family planning consultations) and three additional services at the
secondary care level (C-section, blood transfusion, and obstetric referrals to hospitals). Relative
prices for each service are presented in Appendix Table 1.
Formally, payments to health facilities can be written as:
Pi,m = αi + βmQi,m
where Pi,m is the payment to facility i in month m, αi represents a ﬁxed component, Qi,m is the
vector of targeted service quantities provided by facility i in month m, and βm is the vector of prices
that the government attach to each targeted service in month m. The PBF group was characterized
by a pure performance-based mechanism (αi = 0 and βm > 0), whereas the comparison payment
group had a pure ﬁxed payment (αi > 0 and βm = 0). In order to ensure neutrality in the level of
ﬁnancing between the two groups and isolate the incentive eﬀect from the resource eﬀect, the total
budget allocated to health facilities in the PBF group was the same as the total budget allocated
to health facilities in the ﬁxed payment group:
∀m,
n∑
i=1
αi =
n∑
i=1
βmQi,m
where n is the number of health facilities in the PBF and in the ﬁxed-payment group. Hence,
noting Qm the average service provision in the PBF group in month m and α the average payment
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in the ﬁxed payment group:
α = βmQm
Since the budget of the health provincial authorities was ﬁxed and could not vary every month
depending on the average service provision in the PBF group, α was ﬁxed and βm was adjusted
accordingly at α
Qm
13. Although relative prices attached to the targeted services were constant,
absolute prices and facility payments were thus determined by the quantity of services provided by
the facility relative to the quantity of services provided by the other incentivized health facilities.
The budget used in this experiment estimated at $0.43 per capita per year (average monthly facility
payments were $550 and the average catchment area population was 12,900)14. The average monthly
payment by facility from June 2010 and September 2012 does not diﬀer in the ﬁxed payment and
in the PBF group. This conﬁrms that the experimental design was respected and that the study
isolates the incentive eﬀect from any resource eﬀect. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the average
monthly facility payment over the study period by treatment status. Payments proved more disperse
under PBF than uner ﬁxed-payment, suggesting heterogenous responses to the incentive with some
health facilities getting less than under a ﬁxed payment mechanism and others getting more.
Performance Veriﬁcation
Service volumes were measured by use of monthly reports submitted by facilities, in which the
number of patients for each targeted service was reported. Subsequent veriﬁcation of declared
service volumes was conducted by veriﬁcation agents through (i) comparing reported volumes with
those found in health facility registers15, and (ii) verifying that the information noted in the registers
was true by conducting community veriﬁcation: a random sample of 30 patients16 from registers
were selected and visited by independent associations to check the accuracy of the information
reported in the facility register17. A system of ﬁnancial sanctions was integrated in order to reduce
13The other way to equalize the two total budgets is to ﬁx βm = β and adjust α accordingly at βQm. This technique
was used in the Rwanda experiment where the governmental budget could increase according to the average service
provision in the incentivized group.
14This is lower than in other contexts where output budgets range between $2 and $3 per capita per year.
15Register veriﬁcation was also meant to take place in health facilities under the ﬁxed payment mechanism since
the government wanted to improve the accountability of health facilities in general, not only as an element of PBF.
At endline, the average number of register veriﬁcations in the last 12 months is 7 in both in the PBF and in the
ﬁxed-payment group (p-value of the test of equality of means in the two group = 0.48).
16The 30 patients were chosen such that each targeted service is present in the sample, but none of the non-targeted
services.
17Community veriﬁcations were meant to take place only in the PBF group as part of the ﬁnancing mechanism.
However, we conducted community veriﬁcations in the ﬁxed payment health facilities for impact evaluation purposes
(1 community veriﬁcation by facility in the comparison group). The ﬁxed payment health facilities had no incentive
to cheat on service volumes so the comparison of discrepancy rates between the PBF and the ﬁxed payment groups
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providers' incentives to submit fraudulent reports and over-report phantom patients.
In reality, the community veriﬁcation system proved weak: ﬁrst, PBF facilities only received on
average 3 community veriﬁcations throughout the pilot. Second, there was no eﬀective ﬁnancial
sanction associated with being caught for fraudulent over-reporting. Speciﬁcally, the reductions
in payments were proportionally equal to the percentage of patients not being identiﬁed through
community veriﬁcation. For example, if 18% of patients were not found through community ver-
iﬁcation, the facility would only receive a reduction of 18% in their corresponding payment and
no additional sanctions were enforced. Despite the weak veriﬁcation process, we did not ﬁnd any
signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the propensity to report phantom patients in the registers: the average pro-
portion of missing patients was found 17% in the comparison group whereas 21% in the PBF group,
the diﬀerence being not statistically signiﬁcant (p-value 0.25). However, the health workers in the
PBF group were signiﬁcantly more likely to ﬁll out consultation reports for their patients than in
the ﬁxed payment group: in the endline survey, 94% of health workers declared that they ﬁll out a
consultation report for each patient in the PBF group, whereas only 78% of health workers in the
comparison group (the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 1% level). Since patients are reported in the
register based on consultation reports, service utilization is under-reported in the ﬁxed-payment
group. It is interesting to note that the issue with administrative data is not that incentivized
health workers inﬂate artiﬁcally the number of patients, but rather that the non-incentivized work-
ers under-report the number of patients as they don't have any ﬁnancial beneﬁt of paying the cost
of reporting accurate service volumes. Overall, it is crucial to rely on an independent source of
information about service utilization for the impact evaluation since administrative data does not
give an accurate idea of service utilization in the ﬁxed-payment group.
Autonomy of Payment Allocation
It was found that the autonomy of payment allocation among facility staﬀ in the PBF group led
to a more egalitarian distribution of payments among workers. In the ﬁxed payment group, 77%
of health workers received a share of the payment, whereas 93% of workers in the PBF group
(the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 1% level)18. Actually, PBF beneﬁtted to non-technical workers
(pharmacists, managers, secretaries, receptionists and maintenance workers) who are not in the
allow for diﬀerentiating cheating from natural -unavoidable- discrepancies due to the fact that some patients moved
or were absent at the time of the veriﬁcation.
18This information was collected at endline from the facility heads. The facility heads listed the workers in the
facility, indicated whether each of them received a share of the last payment, and the corresponding amount.
14
governmental payroll and therefore do not receive a share of the ﬁxed payment19. Consistently,
the average last payment to health workers showed less dispersion in the PBF group: the standard
deviation is 36% lower in the PBF group than in the comparison group (the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant
at the 5% level), which conﬁrms the ﬁnding of a more egalitarian distribution of the payment among
workers in the PBF group.
Resulting Structure of Worker Motivation
We want to link our theoretical framework and the actual context of this speciﬁc experiment.
The task workers engage into is attracting patients, and the output is the number of patients.
The experiment manipulates the structure of motivation by adding a contingent reward in worker
utility of attracting patients. In the ﬁxed payment group, worker utility of attracting patients is
driven by the intrinsic value they attribute to this task, as well as a contingent beneﬁt coming from
user fees. In fact, the more health workers consult patients, the higher facility's revenue from user
fees, which constitutes a large part of workers' remuneration. Workers in the ﬁxed payment group
thus already pay attention to extrinsic motives through this beneﬁt from user fees. Let's denote
(α0, f(α0)) the levels of attention paid respectively on extrinsic and intrinsic motives, and F the
level of worker remuneration from user fees, in the ﬁxed payment group. Using the parameters of
our theoretical framework, workers' utility of attracting patients in the ﬁxed payment group is thus
U0 = θ(f(α0)V + α0F )− c
The diﬀerence with the PBF group is the introduction of a new contingent reward from the
government. While governmental payments to the ﬁxed-payment facilities are ﬁxed and do not
play a role in workers' decision to attract patients or not, they do play a role in the PBF group
by increasing workers' beneﬁt of engaging into this task. Let's denote (α1, f(α1)) the new levels
of attention paid on extrinsic and intrinsic motives resulting from the introduction of this new
category of contingent reward, and P the governmental payment. Workers' utility of attracting
patients in the PBF group is thus U1 = θ(f(α1)V + α1(F + P )) − c. After government payments
are withdrawn, worker utility of attracting patients is unchanged in the ﬁxed payment group, while
it becomes U2 = θ((f(α1)V + α1F )− c = U1 − θα1P in the PBF group.
In the rest of the paper, we will present evidence on the relative size of U0 and U1, U0 and U2,
as well as α0 and α1.
19Since the ﬁxed payment is calculated based on the number and qualiﬁcation of workers on the governmental
payroll, the workers typically receive the amount of money corresponding to their contribution to the ﬁxed payment.
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4 Data and Empirical Strategy
4.1 Data Sources
Five sources of data are used for the impact evaluation.
Baseline Survey A survey was administered in Sept-Nov 2009. The sample of health facilities
taking part in the impact evaluation does not entirely coincide with this survey sample : 85% of
health facilities involved in the experiment (129 out of 152) were interviewed in this survey. As a
result, we perform balance checks on this subsample of our experimental sample.
Administrative Data Administrative data was collected every month from January 2010 to
December 2012 from all the 152 health facilities participating in the pilot. This data includes for
each month the number of targeted services provided, the payment due to the health facility, the
actual payment made to the health facility, whether a performance veriﬁcation occurred and related
indicators (% missing patients and consequent ﬁnancial sanctions).
Qualitative Data In April and June 2012, qualitative interviews were performed in 31 health
facilities randomly selected in 4 out of the 8 health zones (Kafubu, Kipushi, Kasenga and Lukafu).
In each facility, one interview was done with the facility head and another one with a health worker
(on a voluntary basis). In total, 29 facility heads and 31 health workers were interviewed, all by
the same person. They were equally distributed between the PBF group and the control group.
Questions were all open and dealt with the perception of the payment (transparency, fairness,
understanding of the calculation), the general functioning of the health facility, recent changes that
might have occurred, and obstacles to improve the number of patients and the quality of services.
Attendance Spotchecks Unannounced spotchecks were performed in July, August and Septem-
ber 2012 in order to collect data on worker attendance in the health facilities that is impervious to
gamming.
Endline Survey A ﬁnal survey was administered in December 2012-February 2013, four months
after the PBF mechanism was withdrawn. The endline survey was administered in 87 out of the
96 health areas involved in the experiment because the rainy season and the insecurity created by
the Maï Maï insurgency made it impossible to reach the other 9 health areas. Attrition occurred at
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the same rate in both groups, with 44 health areas in the PBF group and 43 in the ﬁxed payment
group present at endline.
The endline survey entailed four questionnaires for the facility head, the health workers, patients
straight out of consultation, and households living in the catchement area. All facilities in the 87
health areas that could be reached were interviewed, totalizing 123 health facilities. All the technical
staﬀ in each health facility was also interviewed up to ten persons20, totalizing 332 health workers.
A sample of ten patients per facility was randomly selected for exit interviews, or the maximum
available if fewer are present, totalizing 1,014 patients. Finally, the household questionnaire was
administered to 1,708 households: 20 households were interviewed in each of the 87 health areas,
among which 10 households randomly chosen in the population and 10 randomly chosen among the
households with a pregnancy in the last 12 months21.
Table Appendix 2 reports the distribution of the endline sample across the treatment and the
control groups. Table Appendix 3 shows some descriptive statistics on the endline sample.
4.2 Outcomes of Interest
Accessibility of Health Services - Cost Changes in user fees in the incentivized group would
take place as staﬀ understands the economics by which reducing the cost to patients would lead
to increased utilization and, therefore, increased payments. The reverse eﬀect may happen on
non-targeted services, as a way to compensate for the loss in revenue from targeted services, or
discourage demand for non-targeted services. User fees were collected from the facility heads, and
also from patients straight out of consultation as well as households who used health services in the
last 12 months. In order to compare fees across the largest number of health facilities, we compare
user fees for the most commonly oﬀered services: curative consultations, birth delivery, prenatal
visits, postnatal visits, and preschool consultations. To improve statistical power to detect eﬀects
that go in the same direction within a domain, we also present ﬁndings for a Fee Summary Index
20In the facilities staﬃng more than 10 health workers, 10 were randomly chosen from the list of all health workers
during the facility head interview. The health workers who were present the day when the interviewer visited the
health facility were interviewed on-site, whereas the others were visited at home. Only those health workers who
were out of the neighborhood at the time of the survey (because they were on vacation or because they temporarily
migrated) could not be interviewed.
21The selection of the 20 households was done as follows: four axes in the locality were randomly drawn from a
central point, then one household was visited every ﬁve houses on each axis. - On two axes, all households were
eligible and took the survey if it consented to (otherwise the next household was visited). After each interview, the
interviewer went ﬁve houses further and continued the selection until he could interview 5 household on each axis. -
On the two other axes, only households where a woman had been pregnant in the last 12 months were eligible. If the
household did not meet the criteria, then the next household was visited etc. until an eligible household was found.
After each interview, the interviewer went ﬁve houses further and continued the selection until he could interview 5
household on each axis.
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that aggregates information over all these user fees (following Kling et al, 2007), as well as a Fee
Summary Index for targeted services (curative and prenatal consultations, and birth delivery) and
a Fee Summary Index for non-targeted services (postnatal and preschool consultations).
Accessibility of Health Services - Opening, Attendance, Preventive Sessions and Out-
reach Activities Information about opening hours was collected from facility heads. Worker
attendance (number of health workers present at the facility) and on-the-job eﬀort (number of
health workers actually working) was collected from the unannounced spotchecks when the inter-
viewer arrived22. The number and qualiﬁcation of workers, the number of service varieties oﬀered,
and the number of preventive sessions organized at the facility in the last 12 months were collected
from the facility heads. The number of outreach activities in the community in the last 12 months
was collected from the health workers. Finally, patients and household members were asked about
waiting time before the consultation, and whether s/he could consult every time s/he visited.
Service Quality Service quality is primarily measured by technical quality. Consultation time is
considered as a component of service technical quality, although we use compliance with standard
medical procedures as the main indicator. Compliance was assessed on all patients straight out
of consultation who were asked whether the three following procedures were applied during the
consultation: being weighted, examined and having his tension checked. Compliance was also as-
sessed on women who gave birth in the last 12 months who were asked about standard procedures
applied during prenatal visits (weighing, stomach palpation, tension check, stomach measure, HIV
test, tetanus shot, blood test, urine analysis and information on immunization schedule) and post-
natal visits (stomach palpation, child weighing, child examination, child immunization and child
immunization card). We also measure the proportion of patients straight out of consultation who
were prescribed drugs without them being examined and the number of days women stay at the
facility after giving birth. Beside, we use the proportion of patients who understand the diagnosis
and prescriptions, as well as the proportion of patients and household members who are satisﬁed
with the visit, as complementary measures of service quality.
22Note that the interviewer reported the number of workers present and working without telling to the facility
heads and the workers. The purpose of the visit was oﬃcially related to administrative matters and not attendance
checks in order to avoid any interference with worker behavior at a later point. Observational data on workers'
attendance and on-the-job eﬀort was anonymous and aggregated at the facility level.
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Service Utilization First, we asked women in the households whether they have been sensi-
tized about postnatal and prenatal visits, immunization and family planning by health workers, as
well as whether they know the schedule of the corresponding sessions at the facility. This informa-
tion provides evidence on the immediate eﬀects of the outreach activities performed by the health
workers.
Second, we measure utilization of health services during the last 12 months at the household
level: the proportion of individuals who visited a health facility, who got sick but did not visit, and
-for those who visited- the number of days they waited before they visited. We measure utilization
of immunization using the proportion of children aged 0-5 who took at least one immunization
shot, the number of immunization shots reported in the immunization card, and the proportion
of children who have a scar from TB immunization on the shoulder. Since utilization of maternal
health services is also an important public health objective, we use indicators as the proportion
of attended deliveries among mothers who gave birth in the last 12 months, the proportion of
C-sections, the number of prenatal and postnatal visits at the facility, the proportion of mothers
supplemented with iron and taking medication to prevent malaria, and the number of months
mothers breastfeed their newborn. As for utilization of family planning, we observe the proportion
of women and partners who are in favor of the use of family planning, and the proportion of women
actually using family planning (we distinguish traditional and modern methods).
Finally, we use the number of patients in the last month as reported by the facility head (at
the facility level), and by the health workers (at the individual level). This information provides
evidence on service utilization after PBF was withdrawn in order to assess how the eﬀects of PBF
on service utilization evolved compared to the period when PBF was in place.
Population Health Status We use mortality rates and under-5 weight-for-height z-score to
measure health status in the population. To assess mortality rates, we use information about the
number of persons who died in the last 12 months in the household, and among them the number
of women who died for perinatal reasons and the number of children under 5. We also use the
proportion of new-born in the last 12 months that are still alive. Finally, we use the standard
under-5 weight-for-height z-score as an assessment of child nutrition status.
Health Facility Revenue Depending on the price-elasticity and access-elasticity of the demand
for health services in the population, it is unclear what the eﬀect of PBF on total resources in
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health facilities is. We thus examine all sources of revenue at the facility level the month before the
endline survey as reported by the facility head, as well as workers' payment the month before the
survey as reported by the facility head and health workers themselves.
The enumerators also observed the quantity and quality of equipment and infrastructure during
their visit, which reﬂect both total revenue and management decisions made at the facility level. We
constructed three indices, each index being the ﬁrst component of a principal component analysis.
The quality index is based on direct observation by the enumerator when s/he arrived at the facility
for the endline survey of twelve items: building material, waiting room, consultation room, lavabo,
soap, clean towels, bathrooms, sterilization material, permanent display of user fees and drugs' costs,
use of an examination table and ordinogram. The infrastructure index includes six items: phone
ownership, motorized transportation mean ownership, access to clean water, toilet and electricity,
and hard roof. Finally, the equipment index includes the quantity of ﬁfteen types of medical
equipment owned by the health facility: generator, sterilizer, tensiometer, stethoscope, baby-scales,
weighing scale, height gauge, microscope, gynecological examination table, fridge, delivery boxes,
fuel, kerosene, bed and solar panel.
Health workers' satisfaction, anxiety and motivation At the time of the endline survey,
workers are no longer incentivized in the PBF group so the incentive structure does no longer diﬀer
between the two groups: workers' behavior is driven by intrinsic motivation (perceived value of the
job) and extrinsic motives (job remuneration). Any diﬀerence in worker behavior therefore reﬂects
persistent eﬀects of PBF on either intrinsic motivation, or job remuneration. Staﬀ attendance
provides a measure of workers' total motivation (intrinsic plus extrinsic). We also elicit health
workers' motives. Workers were asked about the main advantage of their occupation, then about
the main inconvenient. These questions were open in order to not induce any type of response
and capture occupation characteristics that are the more salient to them and naturally come at
the top of their mind. We classiﬁed the responses into seven categories of advantages: social
recognition, remuneration, material comfort, care about others' health and life, power, interest in
the activity, and six categories of disadvantages: lack of social recognition, low remuneration, low
material comfort, responsability over others' life, too much pressure and responsability, risk of being
sick due to the contact with patients. We calculate the proportion of workers who mention either
remuneration or material comfort as the main advantage, or low remuneration or low material
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comfort as the main disadvantage. We use this proportion as a measure of the relative importance
of extrinsic versus intrincis motives in workers' total motivation.
4.3 Empirical Strategy
Validation of the Experimental Protocol The internal validity of the impact evaluation relies
on the comparability of the ﬁxed payment and the PBF groups as observed at endline. With a
large number of units of randomization, the law of large numbers insures that the characteristics
in both groups are balanced. Here randomization was done on 96 health areas and it is preferable
to check out whether the pre-program characteristics of the ﬁxed payment and the PBF groups are
similar.
This comparison was done using the 2009 survey. As explained earlier, only 85% of health
facilities involved in the experiment took the 2009 survey. As a result, 129 out of the 152 pilot
health facilities can be observedto check how characteristics were initially balanced between the
ﬁxed payment and the PBF groups.
Most initial characteristics are balanced, although the urban health facilities (17% of the sample)
were not equally distributed in the PBF and ﬁxed payment groups: they represent 12% of the PBF
health facilities while 23% of the ﬁxed payments ones. Since the urban health facilities, staﬀ,
patients and households are likely to diﬀer from the rural ones, Appendix Table 4 present the
means of some observables collected in 2009 in the PBF and ﬁxed payment groups and t-tests for
the null hypothesis that the diﬀerence is zero controlling for a dummy indicating whether the unit
of observation is located in a urban area. 8 diﬀerences in means are signiﬁcant at the 10% level
or less out of 78 tests, meaning the exact amount that would be expected with random sampling
variations.We are therefore conﬁdent that most diﬀerences in outcomes at endline between the two
groups are not driven by initial conditions as long as we control for urban location.
Estimation Strategy For each outcome of interest, we show the estimation results of an equation
of the form:
Yi = α+ βPBFi +X
′
iγ + εi
Where PBF is a dummy for being in the PBF group. Because the treatment was randomly
assigned, it is in expectation uncorrelated with the error term and can therefore be estimated
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through OLS. Coeﬃcient β estimates the average local eﬀect of PBF and is presented in the ﬁrst
column of our result tables. We show the p-value for a test that this coeﬃcient is equal to zero in
the second column of the result tables.
The unit of observation i varies: it stands either for a health area, a health facility, a health
worker, a patient straight out of consultation or a household. Following the results of the balance
checks discussed above, we control for the few variables which proved unbalanced in 2009. The set of
characteristics Xi varies according to the unit of observation i: At the health area level, it includes
a dummy indicating the health zone (the Haut-Katanga province entails eight health zones), a
dummy indicating whether the majority of the health facilities in the area are urban, as well as
a dummy indicating whether the majority of the health facilities in the area are denominational.
At the health facility level, it includes dummies indicating the health zone, whether the health
facility is urban, and whether the health facility is denominational. At the health worker level it
also includes dummies indicating that the health worker is a female, a doctor, a nurse, as well as
the age and number of years of experience of the health worker. At the patient level it includes a
dummy indicating that the patient is a female, the age of the patient, and the reason for the visit.
At the household level, it includes the sex and age of the household member, and for women a
dummy indicating that the woman is literate. The results are robust whether or not these controls
are included in the regression. We favor the results controlling for these characteristics since it
improves the precision of the estimates. Finally, we clustered error terms at the health area level
to take into account potential correlation between units in the same assignment unit.
5 Results
5.1 Accessibility of Health Services
Table 1 and 2 present the eﬀects of PBF on the accessibility of health services: user fees, health
facility opening, staﬀ composition and attendance, oﬀered preventive sessions at the facility and
outreach activities.
Cost of Health Services In Table 1, we ﬁnd consistent evidence that user fees for targeted
services are lower in the PBF health facilities than in the ﬁxed-payment health facilities. The
mean Summary Fee Index for targeted services of the PBF group is 1.08 standard deviations below
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the mean of the comparison group (signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level)23. Figure 3 presents the
distribution of the Summary Fee Index for targeted services by treatment status. We see a much
lower proportion of health facilities at high fee levels and a higher concentration at low fee levels
in the PBF group, suggesting that the decrease in the average fee index mostly results from the
response of those health facilities which would oﬀer high prices under a ﬁxed payment mechanism.
In contrast, the mean Summary Fee Index for non-targeted services of the PBF group is 0.4 standard
deviations below the mean of the comparison group, a diﬀerence which is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Figure 4 shows that the distribution of the Summary Fee Index for non-targeted services in the PBF
group is quite close to the ﬁxed payment group. The health facilities thus strategically responded
to the ﬁnancial incentive by a stronger reduction in the fees for the services that would bring a
beneﬁt, without changing the fees for the other services.
The results found on user fees are robust when the information used comes from the households
and patients straight out of consultation. We also ﬁnd that patients straight out of consultation paid
49% less for the drugs in the PBF health facilities than in the comparison facilities (the diﬀerence
is signiﬁcant at the 1% level).
Overall, the data consistently suggest that health facilities decreased the cost of targeted health
services compared to what they would have done in the absence of PBF, plausibly as a strategy to
attract more patients.
Health Facility Opening, Staﬀ Composition and Staﬀ Attendance Table 2 presents the
eﬀects of PBF on health facility opening and staﬀ attendance. Results show that PBF did not
change the extent to which health facilities are open: 94% of patients and 87% of households
report that they could consult every time they visited the facility. According to the facility heads,
facilities open on average 30 days per month and 139 hours per week. These results suggest that
health facilities are generally open and that the margin of improvement in this domain is almost
nonexistent.
Out of a list of 23 health services that could be oﬀered, the typical health facility oﬀers 14
23The average user fee is lower in the PBF group than in the comparison group for all the four targeted services,
but the diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant only for prenatal visits. The eﬀect of PBF on user fees is strikingly
large for all targeted services except birth delivery : we observe a 61% reduction in the fee for the second (or more)
prenatal consultation (from 132 FC in the comparison group down to 52 FC in the PBF group) and a 48% reduction
in the fee for the ﬁrst prenatal visit (from 850 FC in the comparison group down to 442 FC in the PBF group),
both signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. We also observe a 55% reduction in the fee for the ﬁrst curative consultation
(from 1,263 FC in the comparison group down to 571 FC in the PBF group) but the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant.
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services24. PBF health facilities oﬀer the same number of targeted and non-targeted services as in
the ﬁxed payment group.
PBF did not change the composition of the staﬀ within the facilities, neither the quantity of
staﬀ  which amounts to 7 workers on average, nor the type of workers facilities generally count
two thirds technical (doctors, nurses and birth-assistants) and one third non-technical workers
(pharmacists, managers, secretaries, receptionists and maintenance workers). Doctors represent
only 3% of total staﬀ.
We ﬁnd higher staﬀ attendance under PBF than under ﬁxed-payment in the unannounced visits
in July, August and September 2012: 58% in the comparison group while 65% in the PBF group,
a 14% increase signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Figure 9 shows the distribution of staﬀ attendance
at facilities by treatment status. We see that staﬀ attendance is higher in the PBF group than
in the ﬁxed payment group at any point of the distibution, suggesting that incentivized workers
responded quite similarly to the incentive in terms of their presence. The higher attendance due to
PBF echoes workers' statements in the qualitative interviews: If we work a lot, we will have more
money and conversely, We need to work many days and hours in order to have more patients.
Preventive Sessions at Facilities Incentivized workers organized more preventive sessions at
facilities in the last 12 months than non-incentivized workers (120 instead of 100, although the
diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant), a diﬀerence which is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level for targeted
services (immunization, prenatal care and family planning): 74 preventive sessions were oﬀered for
these services in the comparison group, while 106 in the PBF group. For non-targeted services
(postnatal care and VIH prevention), the number of preventive sessions is also higher in the PBF
group but the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant25. Figures 5 and 6 show the distribution of the number
of preventive sessions for targeted services by treatment status. The positive eﬀect of PBF on
preventive sessions organized at facilities was thus concentrated on targeted services but did not
happen at the expense of non-targeted services.
24Curative consultations, pre and postnatal visits, birth delivery and preschool consultations are oﬀered by more
than 90% of health facilities. Immunization is oﬀered by 88% and family planning by 84%. A smaller proportion of
health facilities oﬀer the other services.
25It is important to notice that the supply for preventive sessions for targeted services is already much higher than
the supply for non-targeted services (out of 100 preventive sessions in the last 12 months, 74 were devoted targeted
services and 26 to non-targeted ones), so the eﬀect of PBF widened the gap between targeted and non-targeted
services.
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Number of Outreach Activities in the Community The number of outreach activities for
targeted services is higher in the PBF group: health workers performed an average of 16 visits to
the community in the last 12 months, while 10 in the ﬁxed payment group, which represents a
60% increase (the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. By contrast, the diﬀerences in the
number of outreach activities for non-targeted services between the PBF and the comparison groups
is small and not signiﬁcant, suggesting no increase at all. Figures 7 and 8 show the distribution of
the number of outreach activities for targeted and non-targeted services by treatment status.
Overall, the accessibility of the PBF health facilities was improved via a decrease in user fees,
an increased staﬀ attendance and a larger number of preventive sessions organized at the facility
and of outreach activities in the community.
5.2 Service Quality
Table 3 presents the eﬀects of PBF on health service quality: technical quality, patients' under-
standing of diagnosis and prescriptions, and patients' satisfaction. While analysing the results on
quality, it is important to keep in mind that this PBF approach did not tie payments to any quality
measures.
Technical Quality of Health Services On average, patients report 16-minute consultations
and household members report 17-minute consultations in the ﬁxed payment group. We don't
observe any diﬀerence induced by PBF in consultation time from the patients, but consultation
time from the household members is found 20 minutes in the PBF group. This ﬁnding at least
dispels the fear that incentives based on the quantity of health services would imply maximizing
the number of patients at the expense of time spent with each of them.
The average compliance rate with standard medical procedures is found pretty low: 35% for
classic patients, 67% for prenatal visits and 62% of postnatal visits. 40% of patients straight out
of consultation also report that drugs were prescribed without them being examined. On average,
women stayed three days in the health facility after giving birth. Overall, our data show that
technical quality is poor and PBF had no impact on it.
Patient's Understanding of Health Services The understanding of diagnosis and next steps
seems good: 83% of patients straight out of consultation declared that they understand the diagnosis
and next steps and 90% knew what drugs they were supposed to take after the consultation.
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Surprisingly, the PBF decreased the proportion of patients who understood which drugs they should
take compared to the comparison group from 90% down to 83%. Most of household members (94%)
also understood the diagnosis provided by the health worker but the PBF had no impact on this
level of understanding.
Patients' Satisfaction Almost all patients  94%  were satisﬁed by their visit at the health
facility. The main reason for satisfaction is the quality of care (57%). The second reason is the
quality of welcome (28%) (note that patients could give multiple responses). It is also worth noting
that user fees and equipment quality were not important reasons neither of satisfaction nor of
dissatisfaction. We ﬁnd a similar pattern of results for household members: 91% declared that
they were satisﬁed, mainly thanks to the quality of care (74%). The quality of welcome was less
considered as a satisfaction criteria (8%) and user fees and equipment quality were still not cited as
major reasons of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Patients thus seem surprisingly indiﬀerent towards
the level of user fees. The PBF did not have any impact on the level of patients' satisfaction.
To conclude on service quality, we don't ﬁnd any consistent trend that allows us to conclude
that the PBF improves the quality of health services. It is important to note that the PBF system
implemented in Haut-Katanga was not based on any quality measures unlike other PBF systems.
Considering this, we could have expected both an increase in service quality as a strategy to attract
patients, or some degradation in the quality of health services due to the focus put on the quantity
of health services. None of it occurred, suggesting that workers' investment in service quality was
not elastic to an incentive based on service volumes.
5.3 Health Service Utilization and Population Health Status
Table 4 presents the eﬀects of PBF on health services utilisation and health outcomes.
As shown in Table 4, 50% of household members visited a health facility in the 12 months before
the survey. PBF had a small negative eﬀect on this proposition reducing it to 47% of the households
members (the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 10% level). Unmet needs remain substantial: 25% of
people in the population was sick and did not visit a health facility in the last 12 months (the other
75% being either not sick or sick but visited a health facility), without any signiﬁcant diﬀerence
under PBF or ﬁxed payment. Finally, household members who visited waited almost 4 days before
the visit and PBF did not reduce the waiting time.
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85% of children aged 0 to 5 received at least one immunization shot based on mother decla-
ration, which is somewhat conﬁrmed by a more objective measure of tuberculosis immunization:
the enumerators could see the TB immunization scar on the shoulder of 60% of children. The
average number of immunization shots is 2.726. We do not ﬁnd any eﬀect of PBF on utilization of
immunization.
82% of births in the last 12 months were attended in a health facility. Women who have been
pregnant in the last 12 months got 3 prenatal visits and 1 postnatal visit at the facility27. Moreover,
38% of these women have been supplemented with iron and 54% have taken medication to prevent
malaria. Finally, mothers breast-fed their child for ﬁve and a half months on average. The PBF had
no impact on these perinatal outcomes. It did not have any impact neither on the use of modern
family planning: only 5% of women aged 15-49 use a modern contraceptive method28.
Overall, we can reject the idea that PBF increased service utilization, which is surprising given
the eﬀort made by the health workers to make health services cheaper and more accessible. Since
our measure of service utilization covers 12 months preceding the endline survey, the absence of
diﬀerence in service utilization between the PBF group and the ﬁxed payment group relates mostly
to the period when the incentives were in place, and incidentally to the period after the incentives
were withdrawn. At baseline, health workers were found to spend numbers of hours in the facility
for an average of only 2 patients per working day. Little demand for health services was thus a
serious concern to start with. Reasons for the lack of response to lower user fees and improved
accessibility could be that prices of health services work as signals for health service quality, or
that people are reluctant to use health services because they do not fully understand its beneﬁts.
Outreach activities should help but only if health workers are trusted by the community, well-
trained, and really take time to inform and convince the population about the beneﬁts of health
services. From the qualitative interviews, we understand that the outreach activities were more
focused on providing information about the schedule of preventive health sessions than on explaining
in details the beneﬁts of the diﬀerent services. Also, poor families face so many challenges a day
causing stress and preoccupation that it might be diﬃcult to carefully weight the costs and beneﬁts
of health services and place health service utilization in the top priorities of the day. The important
result is that the incentivized health workers were not in a position to identify and address the
26Full immunization requires 5 shots, ideally before the child turns 2.
27Note that the number of pre and postnatal visits outside the facility, by healers or den mothers, seems quite low
since including those visits in the count does not increase much the number of visits.
28Modern contraceptive methods are pill, shot, condom, IUD, spermicidal, implant and sterilization.
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barriers to health service uptake, which might be particularly severe in the context of Haut-Katanga
where the population is poor, low-education and generally uninformed about modern medicine. As a
consequence, the indicators of health outcomes (general, maternal, under-5 and new-born mortality,
and under-5 weight-for-height z-score) did not improve (see Table 4).
5.4 Health Facility Revenue
Table 5 presents the eﬀects of PBF on the ressources at the facility level, the health worker's
payment, and the overall quality of the facilities' infrastructure and equipment.
Total Resources at the Facility Level We ﬁnd 42% less total resources in the hands of PBF
health facilities than comparison health facilities the month before the survey, signiﬁcant at the 5%
level. The average revenue from user fees was half as in the comparison group (p-value 0.15), and the
revenue from drugs and medical lab 54% lower (signiﬁcant at the 10% level). In contrast, we don't
observe any diﬀerence in fundings from the government nor NGOs. This result is consistent with our
previous ﬁndings that PBF led to lower user fees and price of drugs than ﬁxed payments without any
increase in service utilization. According to the qualitative interviews, incentivized health workers
who reduced their fees as a strategy to increase demand found themselves in a situation where they
were not able to re-adjust their price schedule and raise prices back to their original values as the
population had become accustomed to the reduced prices (even though utilization did not increase)
and they were fearful of reducing demand to even lower levels.
Workers' Payment As a consequence, salary to health workers was signiﬁcantly lower in PBF
health facilities than in comparison ones. We ﬁnd a 34% reduction in workers' total payment in
the last month as reported by the facility head, and a 28% decrease as reported by the health
workers (signiﬁcant at the 10% and 5% level respectively). Wages from the government are not
statistically diﬀerent in the PBF and the ﬁxed payment group, but we observe a signiﬁcant reduction
in worker payment from the facility itself (which includes revenue from user fees and drug sales,
and incidentally grants from NGOs). This result is thus consistent with the reduced user fees and
drug prices observed in the PBF health facilities' revenue.
Quality of the Facility Infrastructure and Equipment We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative impact
of PBF on the quantity and quality of equipment and infrastructure. The mean quality index in
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the PBF group is 0.53 standard deviations below the mean in the comparison group. Most of
the twelve items included in this index indicate a lower quality of equipment in the PBF facilities -
negative diﬀerences are signiﬁcant for four items: lavabo, clean towels, sterilization material and the
use of an examination table29. Furthermore, the mean equipment index in the PBF group is 0.64
standard deviations below the mean in the comparison group. The components of this index show
that PBF facilities have consistently less equipment than the comparison ones. The diﬀerences are
signiﬁcant for four medical equipments: microscope, gynecological examination table, fridge and
fuel.The day of the survey, the enumerator also checked the availability of ﬁve common vaccines30
and nine common drugs31. We ﬁnd non perfect although not so bad- availability of these products:
four out of ﬁve vaccines and seven out of nine drugs were available in the health facility the day of
the survey. In the last 12 months, 1.5 vaccines and 5 drugs had missed at least once in the health
facility. The PBF had a negative impact on the availability of vaccines the day of the survey, with
less than 3.5 out of ﬁve vaccines available in the PBF group. However, it had no impact on the
availability of vaccines for the last 12 months and on the availability of drugs, either on the day of
the survey or in the last 12 months. These ﬁndings are likely to be related to the reduced revenue in
the PBF group. Because of the lack of resources, PBF health facilities had diﬃculties in investing
in new equipment and renewing the existing one.
Overall, PBF had a signiﬁcant and substantial negative impact on health facilities ressources,
health workers salaries and health faclities infrastructure and equipment.
5.5 Staﬀ Well-Being and Motivation
5.5.1 Staﬀ Well-Being
Table 6 presents the eﬀect of PBF on staﬀ satisfaction, perceived workload, conﬂicts and stress. All
these outcomes are based on self-reported information so it is clearly subjective. Since we do not
see any reason why social desirability bias would be diﬀerent in the PBF and in the ﬁxed payment
group, the comparison between the two groups gives evidence on how PBF aﬀected staﬀ subjective
well-being.
29However, it is worth noting that PBF facilities are more likely to permanently display the user fees and drugs'
costs in the facility.
30Vaccines: DTaP, Poliomyelitis, BCG, Measles and Yellow Fever.
31Drugs: oral rehydration salts, paracetamol, co-trimoxazole, ampicillin, metronidazole, quinine sulfate, mebenda-
zole, tetracycline and Ringer's solution.
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Job Satisfaction PBF induced a 14% signiﬁcant decrease in the job satisfaction of facility staﬀ 
going from 5.7 to 4.9 on a scale from 0 to 10. However, we do not ﬁnd an increase in the proportion
of workers who would go for a position in another health facility. In the qualitative interviews,
many health workers from the PBF group complained about the PBF system and the frustration
they had from the ineﬃciency of their strong eﬀorts to increase the demand: If there is no patient,
we can't do more than working 26 days. The lower job satisfaction is also likely to be related to
the reduced worker salary.
Subjective Workload Overall, more than half of the facility staﬀ ﬁnd their workload heavy
(53%), feel that they had too much work last week (61%) and that they have been tired (56%) in
the last seven days. The PBF decreased signiﬁcantly the perceived workload and fatigue: these
three indicators decreased by respectively 16%, 28% and 16%. As shown in the previous section,
this does not reﬂect any diﬀerence in the eﬀective workload which is similar in both groups. The
change in perception could be due to the disappointing impact of the eﬀort facility staﬀ made to
increase the number of patients: the increased eﬀort to attract patients made the lack of demand
for health services more salient, which could also have contributed to the lower job satisfaction
described above.
Conﬂicts and Stress As PBF induces higher volatility of payments than ﬁxed payments, it
could be a source of stress for the workers. In the comparison group, 39% of the workers declare
that they worry about the volatility of their remuneration, whereas 49% in the PBF group (a 24%
increase), and the diﬀerence is close to signiﬁcant at conventional levels (p-value = 0.11). Actually,
we see a large and signiﬁcant 72% increase in the proportion of facility heads who worry about
the volatility of the payment in the PBF group, but no signiﬁcant increase among the other health
workers (result by category of staﬀ not shown). Importantly, this eﬀect is not due to the lower
remuneration32. In terms of conﬂict, PBF should increase competition between and within facilities
 as payment distribution among health workers can be autonomously decided by the facility head.
Competition between health facilities was not perceived by the workers: 36% facility staﬀ reported
that the facility is in competition with other health facilities in the ﬁxed payment group, with no
signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the PBF group. As for internal competition, the workers declared a level
of conﬂict of 1.72 on a scale from 0 to 10, with no impact of PBF. To provide evidence on the
32Workers worry about the level of their remuneration as much in the PBF group as in the ﬁxed payment group.
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distribution of worker eﬀort within facility and possible free-riding issue due to PBF, we compared
the standard deviation of eﬀort measures within facility: number of outreach activities performed
in the last 12 months, number of hours worked the last day and the last week, number of patients
consulted the last week and the last month. We don't ﬁnd any signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the standard
deviation of eﬀort measures within facility (results not shown, available upon request). This ﬁnding
suggests that there was not free-riding taking place despite the collective nature of the incentive,
consistent with the lack of increase in conﬂict within facility. However, 14% of the workers declared
that the distribution of the payment within the facility was a source of conﬂict, while 27% in the
PBF group, but the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant (p-value=0.17).
Overall we observe a lower perceived workload and a lower satisfaction in the PBF group, both
likely due to the disappointing impact of increased eﬀort on the number of patients and worker
salary. PBF also increased the proportion of facility heads who worry about the volatility of the
payment but did not increase the level of conﬂict within facilities.
5.5.2 Staﬀ Motivation
Staﬀ Motivation When the Incentives were in Place
As shown in Table 2, workers' eﬀort to attract patients is larger under performance-based payment
than ﬁxed-payment, which we interpret as an increase in worker motivation due the incentive.
Besides, we don't ﬁnd evidence that the collective nature of the incentive led to free-riding: the
standard deviation of a number of eﬀort measures at the worker level, like the number of outreach
activities performed in the last 12 months, the number of patients in the last day or last week, or
working time at the facility in the last day, week and month, was found statistically similar in the
PBF and ﬁxed payment group (results not shown, available upon request).
Staﬀ Motivation After the Incentives were Removed
Table 6 presents the eﬀect of PBF on staﬀ attendance after PBF was removed, and the proportion
of workers who report material beneﬁts as the main advantage or disadvantage of the job.
Staﬀ Attendance The positive eﬀect of the incentive on staﬀ attendance reversed at endline
after PBF has been withdrawn. The interviewers did not announce the day they would arrive in
the facility for the endline survey to avoid manipulation of staﬀ attendance. Attendance rate in
the ﬁxed payment group was found 57%, similar to before the payment was withdrawn: 58%. In
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contrast, a striking reversal happened in the PBF group where attendance rate was found 65%
before the incentive was withdrawn while only 45% after. This represent a substantial reduction
in the number of workers observed by the interviewer when s/he arrived: 3.8 in the comparison
group while 2.5 in the PBF group (the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 5% level). Figure 10 shows the
distribution of staﬀ attendance at facilities after the pilot by treatment status. Staﬀ attendance is
lower in the PBF group than in the ﬁxed payment group at any point of the distibution, suggesting
again that workers responded quite similarly to the end of the incentive33.
The ﬁnancial incentive thus induced higher worker total motivation compared to ﬁxed payments
as long as the incentives were in place, but lower total motivation after the incentive was withdrawn.
It is important to keep in mind that worker attendance was found higher in the PBF group than
in the ﬁxed payment in July, August and September 2012, when the depressing impact of PBF on
user fee revenue and worker salaries had already taken place. Also, payments from the governement
stopped in the PBF and in the ﬁxed payment group at the same time, which represents the same
average reduction in health facilities' revenue by design. The reversal in staﬀ attendance diﬀerence
between PBF and ﬁxed payment facilities thus happened in a context where facilities' revenue
decreased by the same amount. Therefore, the reason for the reversal is unlikely to be driven by
the level of worker income, suggesting a change in the structure of worker motivation.
Attention Paid to Material Beneﬁts In the ﬁxed payment group, 38% of workers mention
spontaneously remuneration or material comfort as the main advantage or disadvantage of their
position, as opposed to non material beneﬁts like social recognition or health beneﬁts to the popu-
lation. This proportion increases dramatically to 51% in the PBF group (a 34% increase signiﬁcant
at the 5% level). This ﬁnding suggests that exposure to PBF changed the salience of ﬁnancial
motives in health workers' mind. Importantly, this change is also unlikely to be driven by the
decrease in user fee revenue and workers' remuneration since we observe a signiﬁcant increase in
the proportion of workers who mention ﬁnancial beneﬁts as the main advantage (from 11% to 17%,
signiﬁcant at the 10% level), while a smaller and insigniﬁcant increase in the proportion of workers
who mention ﬁnancial beneﬁts as the main disadvantage (from 29% to 35%, p-value 0.15). This
ﬁnding gives evidence of a shift in attention from the intrinsic value that the worker attributes to
her job in favor of the external beneﬁt. We interpret this eﬀect as evidence that incentives can not
33This result is consistent withdeclarative data from the workers: worker attendance rate in the last seven days is
found 78% in the ﬁxed payment group while 71% in the PBF group (p-value of the test of equality 0.04).
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only inform ignorant agents about some attributes of the task or their ability to perform, but also
change the locus of control from internal to external by increasing the weight of external motives
in worker utility.
To summarize the eﬀects of PBF on worker motivation, we ﬁnd that: 1) When PBF is in place,
worker's total motivation is higher under PBF (U0 < U1) despite the fact that worker salary from
user fees are lower than under ﬁxed payments (F1 < F0); 2) After PBF is withdrawn, worker total
motivation is lower in the group who was exposed to PBF (U2 < U0), which might be attributed to
two facts: (i) Worker salary is lower than in the group who was under ﬁxed payments (F2 < F0); (ii)
Attention paid to ﬁnancial motives relative to intrinsic motives proved more important (α0 < α1),
and this change is not due to the decrease in worker salary.
6 Conclusion
This study examines a performance-based payment mechanism compared to a ﬁxed payment mech-
anism to health care providers in the district of Haut-Katanga, DRC. The performance-based pay-
ment studied was conditional on the number of patients for some pre-determined services, which
is one speciﬁc approach of PBF. The ﬁndings show that the performance-based mechanism led to
increased eﬀort by health workers to attract more patients for health services that were included
in the performance measure, without crowding out non-targeted services and service quality, nor
generating new conﬂicts within the facilities. However, the increased eﬀort made by the health
workers did not lead to signiﬁcant changes in the utilization of health services by the population,
leading to a very disappointing reduction in facility revenue and worker income. This ﬁnding sug-
gests that health workers were not able to ﬁnd the successful strategies and innovate to change
health-seeking behavior. A question is whether the lack of inventiveness and creativity required
to increase demand for health services is due to the ﬁnancial incentive itself by focusing attention
and limiting thecapacity to draw unusual connections between elements, as argued in the psycho-
logical literature, or due to the diﬃculty of the task itself and the lack of skills and human capital
of the health workers in this speciﬁc context. Importantly, we also ﬁnd that PBF created a shift
in workers' attention from non-ﬁnancial to ﬁnancial motives apart from the reduction in worker
income, and that workers decreased their eﬀort after the incentive was removed. In terms of policy
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lessons, these ﬁnding suggest that ﬁnancial incentives should be used as a permanent policy rather
than a temporary policy in order to limit the adverse eﬀects of the motivational shift, and only
in situations where the task is easy so that workers have the capacity to carry out the rewarded
output.
The lack of response of the population challenges the idea that the demand for health services is
elastic in all contexts: substantial decreases in prices were not able to encourage more demand, nor
did improved accessibility. Speciﬁc interventions to stimulate demand for health may be combined
with supply-side interventions like PBF. When asked about the reason for their (dis-)satisfaction
in our survey, people proved mostly sensitive to service quality. One possibility would be thus to
include service quality in the set of purchased performances as it was done in Rwanda, with the hope
that health providers would engage into quality improvements that would attract more patients.
Alternatively, interventions to improve awareness about the beneﬁts of health products or to help
people overcome behavioral issues like procrastination could supplement a PBF mechanism.
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Figure 1: Performance-Based Financing in Africa
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Figure 2: Monthly Payment Distribution, by Treatment Status
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Figure 3: Distribution of the Fee Summary Index for Targeted Services, by Treatment Status
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Figure 4: Distribution of the Fee Summary Index for Non-Targeted Services, by Treatment
Status
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Figure 5: Distribution of Preventive Sessions Organized at Facilities for Targeted Services, by
Treatment Status
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Figure 6: Distribution of Preventive Sessions Organized at Facilities for Non-Targeted Services,
by Treatment Status
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Figure 7: Distribution of Outreach Activities for Targeted Services, by Treatment Status
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Figure 8: Distribution of Outreach Activities for Non-Targeted Services, by Treatment Status
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Figure 9: Distribution of Staﬀ Attendance during the Pilot, by Treatment Status
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Figure 10: Distribution of Staﬀ Attendance after the Pilot, by Treatment Status
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Table 1: Eﬀects on User Fees
Average 
Treatment 
Effect (ATE)
p-value 
(ATE=0)
Mean of Dep. 
Var. (Control)
St.dev. of Dep. 
Var. (Control) Observations
The Facility Head reports: 
Fee Summary Index at the facility level -1.077 0.141 .166473 4.212105 93
Fee Summary Index at the facility level, targeted services -.807 0.061* .0366889 2.866472 109
Fee Summary Index at the facility level, non-targeted services -.398 0.346 .1007338 2.064238 95
Targeted Services
User fee for the first curative consultation -692.45 0.281 1263.492 4557.316 123
User fee for delivery -224.185 0.655 2747.414 2423.25 113
User fee for the first prenatal visit -407.873 0.095* 850 1741.42 118
User fee for the second prenatal visit -80.801 0.053* 132.2034 264.8622 115
Non-Targeted Services
User fee for the second curative consultation -178.082 0.18 459.4828 799.0377 112
User fee for postnatal visit -57.43 0.386 105.3571 430.8215 111
User fee for preschool consultation -6.718 0.838 86.66666 154.8281 112
Patients and Community Members report: 
Fee paid for the delivery 301.24 0.762 9532.258 11570.85 773
Fee paid for the last postnatal visit -71.637 0.35 400.8342 712.8497 392
Fee paid for the last prenatal visit -112.969 0.125 665.5804 976.022 929
Fee paid for the last immunization shot -22.096 0.237 87.71028 316.9161 2039
Cost of drugs purchased by the patient at the health facility (FC) -1106.16 0.005*** 2252.593 5166.591 980
Targeted services: first curative consultation, delivery, and prenatal visits
Fee Summary Index is the equally weighted average of z-scores of its components. The z-scores are calculated by subtracting the control group mean and dividing by the 
control group standard deviation. The components of the index are fees paid for first and second curative consultations, delivery, prenatal and postnatal visits, and preschool consultation. 
Non-targeted services: second curative consultation, postnatal visit, and preschool consultation
Data Source: Endline survey. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10%. Error terms are clustered at the health area level. We control for the urban/rural location of the health facility.
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Table 2: Eﬀects on Service Accessibility
Average 
Treatment 
Effect (ATE)
p-value 
(ATE=0)
Mean of Dep. 
Var. (Control)
St.dev. of Dep. 
Var. (Control) Observations
a. Health Facility Opening, Services Offered and Staff
Opening
Number of opening hours per week (as reported by the facility head) -6.522 0.524 138.9262 47.86586 116
Number of opening days in the last month (as reported by the facility head) -.139 0.816 29.73016 1.885482 119
The patient could consult each time s/he visited -.019 0.322 .9375 .2422843 993
The household member  could consult each time s/he visited .016 0.351 .857081 .3500661 4323
Services Offered at the Facility
Number of services offered by the facility (between 0 and 23) -.492 0.35 13.55556 3.644606 123
Number of targeted services offered by the facility (between 0 and 10) -.141 0.606 7.730159 1.715267 123
Number of non-targeted health services offered by the facility (between 0 and 13) .143 0.723 5.825397 2.393133 123
Staff Composition 
Number of workers in the facility -.923 0.309 7.047619 5.692181 123
% health workers in the facility .027 0.425 .683401 .1826084 123
% doctors in the facility -.001 0.933 .0271569 .0575394 123
Number of workers who left the facility in the last 12 months -.009 0.972 .7619048 1.011455 123
Staff Attendance
Av. % workers present in the facility on unannounced visits 1, 2 and 3 .074 0.067* .5807223 .2924829 138
b. Preventive Sessions Organized in the Last 12 Months (Facility level)
Number of preventive sessions at facility provided in the last 12 months 20.084 0.291 100.4426 82.87933 118
Number of preventive sessions at facility for targeted services provided in the last 12 months 31.542 0.044** 73.91803 57.09679 119
Number of preventive sessions at facility for non-targeted services provided in the last 12 months 10.808 0.107 26.87097 31.89197 120
c. Outreach Activities in the Last 12 Months (Health Worker level)
Number of outreach activities performed in the last 12 months 7.184 0.171 15.23295 44.47532 326
Number of outreach activities for targeted services performed in the last 12 months 5.976 0.096* 9.829545 26.42281 326
Number of outreach activities for non-targeted services performed in the last 12 months 1.208 0.523 5.403409 19.53698 326
Preventive sessions include: immunization, prenatal care and family planning (targeted services), postnatal care and HIV prevention (non-targeted services).
Data Source: Endline survey. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10%. Error terms are clustered at the health area level. We control for the urban/rural location of the health facility.
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Table 3: Eﬀects on Service Quality
Average 
Treatment Effect 
(ATE)
p-value (ATE=0) Mean of Dep. Var. (Control)
St.dev. of Dep. 
Var. (Control) Observations
a. Technical Quality
By the patient
Consultation time (minutes) 1.028 0.422 16.09263 15.51822 974
Compliance rate with medical procedure, any care service -.015 0.695 .3538175 .3248204 984
Drugs were prescribed to the patient and the patient was not examined .02 0.66 .4077491 .49187 991
By the household member
Consultation time (minutes) 2.581 0*** 16.98827 15.74057 4309
Number of days in the health facility after the delivery -.077 0.689 2.313283 1.702673 767
Compliance rate with medical procedure, prenatal care service .004 0.818 .6657578 .1680248 923
Compliance rate with medical procedure, postnatal care service .048 0.123 .6166667 .258334 389
b. Patient's Understanding
The patient understands diagnosis and next steps .007 0.813 .8268877 .3786932 992
The patient knows what drugs to be taken -.072 0.039** .9042357 .294539 991
The household member understands diagnosis .017 0.241 .9372237 .2426138 4258
c. Patients' Satisfaction
The Patient reports that s/he was…
satisfied .013 0.359 .9430147 .2320279 994
satisfied thanks to user fees .012 0.48 .0277778 .1644879 990
satisfied thanks to care quality .003 0.937 .5722222 .4952152 990
satisfied thanks to welcome quality -.027 0.442 .2796296 .4492334 990
satisfied thanks to equipment quality 0 0.997 .0333333 .1796719 990
dissatisfied thanks to user fees 0 0. 0 0 993
dissatisfied thanks to care quality -.005 0.671 .0349265 .1837626 993
dissatisfied thanks to welcome quality 0 0.946 .0073529 .0855121 993
dissatisfied thanks to equipment quality -.006 0.359 .0110294 .1045364 993
The Household Member reports that s/he was…
satisfied .004 0.778 .9142857 .2800023 4326
satisfied thanks to user fees .006 0.646 .0415945 .1997039 4318
satisfied thanks to care quality -.005 0.857 .7417678 .4377572 4318
satisfied thanks to welcome quality -.008 0.547 .0836222 .2768804 4318
satisfied thanks to equipment quality .001 0.855 .0186308 .1352467 4318
dissatisfied thanks to user fees 0 0.934 .0113191 .1058105 4312
dissatisfied thanks to care quality -.002 0.853 .0487593 .2154112 4312
dissatisfied thanks to welcome quality -.001 0.844 .0104484 .1017042 4312
dissatisfied thanks to equipment quality .001 0.76 .008707 .0929245 4312
Data Source: Endline survey. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10%. Error terms are clustered at the health area level. We control for the urban/rural location of the health facility.
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Table 4: Eﬀects on Service Utilization and Health Outcomes
Average 
Treatment Effect 
(ATE)
p-value (ATE=0) Mean of Dep. Var. (Control)
St.dev. of Dep. 
Var. (Control) Observations
Curative Services
The household member visited a health facility in the last 12 months -.051 0.006*** .4961274 .5000388 9113
Have been sick in the last 12 month but did not visit a health facility 0,012 0,483 0,2500537 0,4330902 9124
If was sick and visited, number of days before s/he visited a health facility .014 0.957 3.643269 7.464664 3553
Child Immunization 
Ever had an immunization shot -.002 0.94 .8486739 .3585063 2448
Number of immunization shots based on the immunization card -.023 0.961 2.706977 3.186173 833
Has a scar from tuberculosis immunization .016 0.677 .6 .4900902 2441
Perinatal Care
The mother delivered in a health facility -.015 0.684 .8241309 .3810987 961
The mother had a C-section .018 0.121 .0173697 .130807 773
Number of prenatal visits at a health facility -.281 0.14 3.357782 2.122774 1120
Number of postnatal visits at a health facility .055 0.622 .8650306 1.426543 959
Number of prenatal visits, including healers and den mothers -.292 0.13 3.482944 2.243731 1117
Number of postnatal visits, including healers and den mothers .058 0.655 1.10041 1.778309 957
The mother is supplemented in iron .005 0.888 .3875 .487615 1121
The mother takes drugs to avoid malaria -.037 0.369 .5392857 .4988999 1121
Number of months the mother breast-fed her new-born .3 0.335 5.494845 3.787549 955
Family Planning
The women is pro family planning -.044 0.132 .4632353 .4989086 1874
The partner is pro family planning -.022 0.443 .316894 .46551 1871
The women uses a modern contraceptive method .005 0.69 .0505263 .2191437 1873
Number of Patients at Endline (After PBF was withdrawn)
At the Facility Level, Last Month
Number of patients for targeted services -61.714 0.628 605.6102 1194.306 112
Number of patients for all services -49.916 0.732 832 1378.686 109
At the Health Worker Level, Last Month
Number of patients for targeted services -21.383 0.468 156.8494 176.6688 316
Number of patients for all services -29.925 0.387 239.3313 245.167 309
Health Outcomes
Weight-for-height z-score -0.347 0.306 0.4450215 5.516395 2403
Number of persons in the household who died in the last 12 months .007 0.732 .1366313 .4006933 1708
Number of women in the household who died for perinatal reasons in the last 12 months -.004 0.427 .009434 .0967264 1707
Number of children under 5 in the household who died in the last 12 month .012 0.55 .0896226 .3171387 1707
The child born is the last 12 month is still alive -.01 0.093* .9897751 .1007032 961
Data Source: Endline survey. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10%. Error terms are clustered at the health area level. We control for the urban/rural location of the health facility.
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Table 5: Eﬀects on Facilities' Total Ressources
Average 
Treatment 
Effect (ATE)
p-value 
(ATE=0)
Mean of Dep. 
Var. (Control)
St.dev. of Dep. 
Var. (Control) Observations
Total Resources at the Facility Level
Revenue from user fees -156138.6 0.148 310434.5 770580.8 120
Revenue from drugs and medical lab -136695.9 0.083* 252311.2 494647.2 118
Revenue from the government -979.111 0.991 159759 391370.4 123
Revenue from NGOs and private donors -17243.2 0.257 11071.43 84488.68 123
Total revenue -306889.1 0.04** 738938.4 1267279 118
Workers' Payment
Payment to the Workers (reported by the Facility Head)
Average total payment per worker in the last month (FC) -19252.79 0.079* 56168.16 71476.75 118
Average wage from the government per worker in the last month (FC) -1103.906 0.853 9439.635 49938.38 120
Average payment from the facility per worker in the last month (FC) -17492.58 0.099* 46466.35 56203.52 121
Payment to the Health Workers (reported by the Health Workers)
Total payment in the last month (FC) -35885.75 0.031** 127139.5 174494.9 282
Wage received from the government in the last month (FC) -4999.407 0.5 23654.04 88004.44 326
Payment received from the facility in the last month (FC) -28682.54 0.061* 102552.8 153866.8 285
Quality of the Facility Infrastructure and Equipment
Quality index based on interviewers' observation (Principal Component Analysis) -.525 0.014** .1990995 1.511479 116
Infrastructure index (Principal Component Analysis) .184 0.372 -.1715342 1.425423 110
Equipment index (Principal Component Analysis) -.639 0.026** .052816 2.226755 116
Number of types of vaccine currently available (between 0 and 5) -.744 0.034** 4.16129 1.738603 118
Number of types of vaccine that have been unavailable at some point in the last 12 months (between 0 and .036 0.929 1.52381 1.740014 118
Number of types of drug currently available (between 0 and 9) .236 0.646 6.7 3.185241 117
Number of types of drug that have been missing once in the last 12 months (between 0 and 9) -.276 0.589 5.333333 3.445148 111
Data Source: Endline survey. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10%. Error terms are clustered at the health area level. We control for the urban/rural location of the health facility.
6. HEALTH FACILITIES' RESOURCES
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Table 6: Eﬀects on Staﬀ Well-Being and Intrinsic Motivation
Average 
Treatment Effect 
(ATE)
p-value (ATE=0) Mean of Dep. Var. (Control)
St.dev. of Dep. 
Var. (Control) Observations
Job Satisfaction
Level of satisfaction of the facility staff for his job (from 0 to 10) -0,769 0.045** 5,705394 2,783944 455
The facility staff would go for a position in another facility -0,031 0,564 0,7095436 0,4549178 455
The facility staff would go for a position in another facility for financial reasons -0,089 0,155 0,6224067 0,485794 455
Subjective Workload
The facility staff founds his workload heavy -0,086 0.093* 0,5291666 0,5001917 454
The facility staff reports too much work in the last 7 days -0,169 0.002*** 0,6092437 0,4889482 444
The facility staff felt tired due to the job in the last 7 days -0,092 0.079* 0,5606695 0,4973471 445
Conflicts, Stress and Anxiety 
The facility staff worries about insecure / volatile remuneration 0,095 0,117 0,3886256 0,4885971 388
The facility staff worries about low remuneration -0,057 0,256 0,4691943 0,5002369 388
The facility staff reports that the facility is in competition with other facilities -0,007 0,898 0,3583333 0,4805129 454
Level of conflicts among workers perceived by the facility staff (from 0 to 10) -0,155 0,521 1,717842 2,203041 453
The health worker reports that PARSS payment allocation is a source of conflict in the facility .129 0.172 .1413043 .3502439 165
Staff Effort (Attendance) after PBF was withdrawn
Number of workers in the facility on unnanounced visit 4 (enline survey) -1.354 0.032** 3.84127 3.418198 123
% workers present in the facility on unannounced visit 4 (endline survey) -.121 0.099* .5741979 .3109018 123
Av. attendance rate of workers in the facility in the last 7 days (as reported by the facility head) -.09 0.155 .7752835 .1929815 123
Attendance rate in the facility in the last 7 days (as reported by the Health Worker) -.067 0.042** .7799358 .1429585 331
Importance Attached to Job Remuneration
The facility staff elicits financial benefits as the main advantage or disadvantage of his position .117 0.025** .3833333 .4872145 454
The facility staff elicits financial benefits as the main advantage of his job .065 0.075* .1087866 .3120247 452
The facility staff elicits financial benefits as the main disadvantage of his job .063 0.155 .2916667 .4554796 454
Data Source: Endline survey. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10%. Error terms are clustered at the health area level. We control for the urban/rural location of the health facility.
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Appendix Table 1: Relative Prices of Targeted Health Services
Service Indicator Relative 
Price 
(USD) 
 
Services targeted at health centers and referral health centers  
Curative care Per new curative consultation  $0.6 
Institutional delivery Per delivery at the health center $5 
Obstetric referral Per pregnant woman referred to the referral 
center/hospital 
$5 
Full childhood immunization Per fully immunized child $3.5 
Prenatal care Per prenatal care consultation $1.2 
Tetanus toxoid vaccination Per 5th dose of tetanus toxoid vaccination $2 
Family planning Per woman that uses a modern method of family 
planning 
$4.5 
 
Additional services targeted only at referral health centers: 
Caesarean section Per caesarean section delivery (and decision-tree has 
been followed) 
$30 
Blood transfusion, when 
appropriate 
Per transfusion episode $5 
Obstetric referral Per delivery referred to the referral center/ hospital” $5 
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Appendix Table 2: Endline Sample
Endline Sample, by Payment Status 
 PBF Group Comparison Group Total 
Health areas 44 43 87 
Health Facilities 60 63 123 
Facility Staff 154 178 332 
Patients 470 544 1,014 
Households 859 849 1,708 
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Appendix Table 3: Descriptive Statistics at Endline (Source:
2013 Endline Survey)
 
 
Mean Standard Deviation 
Nb. of 
Observations 
A. HEALTH FACILITY     
The facility is a "Centre de Santé de Référence" 0.11 0.31 123 
The facility is a "Centre de Santé"  0.69 0.46 123 
The facility is a "Poste de Santé"  0.20 0.40 123 
The facility is public 0.66 0.48 123 
The facility is religious 0.15 0.36 123 
The facility is private/ngo 0.19 0.39 123 
The facility is urban/semi-urban 0.17 0.38 123 
The facility is rural 0.83 0.38 123 
Served population size  12872.76 11570.57 123 
Distance to CSR/Hospital (km) 34.85 41.80 123 
Distance to supervisor (km) 60.77 58.70 123 
% female workers in the facility 0.42 0.20 123 
% doctors in the facility 0.03 0.06 123 
% health workers in the facility  0.70 0.18 123 
The facility entails a pharmacy 0.93 0.25 121 
The facility head thinks that current workers can meet the 
demand 0.79 0.41 121 
    B. HEALTH WORKERS    
The health worker was there the day of the visit 0.69 0.46 326 
The health worker is a female 0.57 0.50 332 
Age of the health worker (years) 42.14 11.20 332 
The health worker is a doctor in the facility  0.06 0.23 332 
The health worker is a nurse in the facility  0.57 0.50 332 
Number of weeks of medical training  9.74 15.11 328 
Number of years of experience 12.56 10.13 331 
Number of years of experience in this center 5.53 5.84 331 
The health worker thinks that current workers can meet the 
demand 0.88 0.32 332 
    C. PATIENT    
The patient is a female 0.67 0.47 1006 
Age of the patient (years) 18.61 17.39 1002 
Time to go to the health facility (minutes) 50.89 332.98 1010 
Cost to go to the health facility (FC) 249.36 1842.44 1012 
Total Cost to go the health facility (FC) 707.79 5978.32 997 
The health facility is the first visited 0.17 0.37 1014 
The health facility chosen is the closest one 0.65 0.48 1014 
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Appendix Table 3: Descriptive Statistics at Endline (Contin-
ued)
 
Mean St.dev. Nb. of Observations 
D. HOUSEHOLD    
The household is from the Bemba ethnic group 0.46 0.50 1707 
The household is from the Baluba ethnic group 0.10 0.30 1707 
The household is from the Lamba ethnic group 0.10 0.30 1707 
Household religion is christian 0.92 0.27 1707 
Time to go to the health facility during dry season (minutes) 41.34 53.41 1698 
    
a. All household members    
Women between 15-49 years old 0.21 0.40 9234 
Children under 5 0.27 0.45 9234 
Age of the household member (years) 17.17 16.13 9135 
The household member is a female 0.50 0.50 9225 
Literacy for 15 and above 0.57 0.49 4166 
Has ever been to school 0.49 0.50 9234 
Number of school years 2.59 3.56 9207 
Level of education 0.63 0.73 9218 
Currently at school 0.18 0.39 9234 
Has worked in the last 12 months 0.32 0.47 9233 
If worked, has worked in the agriculture/farm sector 0.84 0.37 2932 
Time to go to the health facility (minutes) 44.34 65.59 4345 
Cost to go to the health facility (FC) 266.75 1454.21 4336 
Total cost to go to the health facility (FC) 4254.49 21808.55 4254 
The health facility is the first visited 0.13 0.34 4357 
    
b. Women between 15-49 years old    
Has been pregnant in the last 12 months 0.36 0.48 906 
Knows whether and when she would like a child 0.85 0.36 1826 
Does not want a child 0.06 0.25 1826 
Desired time until next child (years) 2.34 1.07 1428 
Sexually active 0.81 0.39 1888 
If uses condoms, uses everytime 0.31 0.47 45 
    c. Women who have been pregnant in the last 12 months    
The pregnancy was wanted 0.68 0.47 1128 
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Appendix Table 4: Balance Checks
Facilities General Characteristics 
Dependant variable 
control 
mean 
Coef. on 
treatment p value 
Number of 
observation 
% Of health facility center vs health post 0.781 -0.033 0.667 129 
Number of beds in the facility 8.953 1.811 0.379 129 
% Patients in facility with free consultation 16.55 3.249 0.514 128 
Health facility affiliation (%)     
Public 0.594 -0.043 0.616 129 
Private 0.281 -0.085 0.230 129 
Denominational 0.125 0.128 0.068 129 
Employee in the facility     
Number of employee in the facility 6.203 -0.061 0.933 129 
Number of female employee 3.281 0.377 0.347 129 
Number of doctor employed 0.328 0.037 0.746 129 
Accessibility     
% Facilities open six days a week 0.234 -0.023 0.757 129 
% Facilities open 24h/24 0.797 0.031 0.661 129 
Obstacles to service quality (%facilities for each)    
Lack of medication 0.594 -0.079 0.375 129 
Lack of materials 0.703 -0.074 0.384 129 
Low salary 0.672 -0.045 0.604 129 
Lack of equipment 0.672 -0.057 0.509 129 
Lack of water 0.641 0.011 0.898 129 
Lack of electricity 0.656 -0.090 0.266 129 
Lack of financial resources 0.656 -0.105 0.233 129 
Operational years of the facility 20.18 -0.046 0.991 122 
Population served by the facility 11.129 1283.750 0.660 122 
Area served (km2) by the facility 369.0 -23.141 0.880 109 
Coefficients from an Ordinary Least Square regression of the dependent variable on the treatment dummy and the urban 
dummy. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Appendix Table 4: Balance Checks (Continued)
Facilities Infrastructures and Equipment 
Dependant variable control mean 
Coef. on 
treatment p value 
Number of 
observation 
Infrastructure (% facilities with)   
Water Access 0.625 -0.115 0.198 129 
Electricity 0.281 -0.036 0.577 129 
Waste disposal 0.719 -0.037 0.650 129 
Sewage disposal 0.438 0.150 0.079 129 
Equipments (% facilities with)    
Pharmacy 0.844 0.095 0.092 129 
Transport mean 0.484 0.171 0.055 129 
Phone 0.219 -0.172 0.001** 129 
Electricity generator 0.188 -0.021 0.759 129 
Autoclave 0.453 0.059 0.512 129 
Blood pressure cuff 0.844 -0.095 0.194 129 
Stethoscope 0.984 -0.102 0.026* 129 
Scale 0.859 -0.018 0.778 129 
Height gauge 0.406 -0.035 0.689 129 
Microscope 0.422 0.083 0.344 129 
Examination table 0.672 -0.117 0.184 129 
Refrigerator 0.375 -0.090 0.279 129 
Delivery box 0.625 0.002 0.985 129 
Fuel for generator 0.0625 -0.006 0.874 129 
Kerosene for refrigerator 0.0469 0.085 0.105 129 
Coefficients from an Ordinary Least Square regression of the dependent variable on the treatment dummy and the urban 
dummy. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Appendix Table 4: Balance Checks (Continued)
Staff Characteristics 
Dependant variable 
control 
mean 
Coef. on 
treatment p value 
Number of 
observation 
% Cell phone owner 0.646 -0.048 0.279 457 
Staff age 40.31 0.010 0.992 456 
Month of training  24.25 -0.928 0.592 452 
Staff job position  (%)     
Doctor 0.0422 0.016 0.381 457 
Pharmacist 0.0844 -0.001 0.983 457 
Nurse qualified 0.236 -0.015 0.707 457 
Nurse 0.312 -0.008 0.846 457 
Midwife 0.156 0.007 0.839 457 
Adjunct 0.169 0.001 0.987 457 
Staff gender (% female) 0.481 -0.097 0.041* 457 
Staff level of education (%)     
No education 0.0759 -0.015 0.538 457 
Primary education  0.0802 -0.016 0.539 457 
Secondary education 0.312 0.063 0.148 457 
Technical education 0.304 -0.045 0.286 457 
Higher education 0.228 0.013 0.722 457 
Job experience (years)     
Seniority as health agent 10.97 -1.685 0.095 457 
Seniority in this facility 4.667 -0.768 0.226 457 
Work condition     
Hours worked per week  52.10 -0.236 0.920 421 
Had patients over the last month 0.873 0.018 0.564 456 
Average number of patient 35.46 -2.798 0.504 392 
Consider having too many patients 0.473 0.014 0.790 398 
Medical staff satisfaction 0.477 0.050 0.295 457 
Would like to leave this facility 0.603 -0.011 0.820 457 
Coefficients from an Ordinary Least Square regression of the dependent variable on the treatment dummy and the urban 
dummy. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Appendix Table 4: Balance Checks (Continued)
Access, Cost and Service Quality 
Dependant variable 
control 
mean 
Coef. on 
treatment p value 
Number of 
observation 
Household distance from health center (km) 6.229 1.314 0.295 775 
Number of days with symptoms before visiting the 
health center 17.766 -1.128 0.755 569 
Time waiting at the health center before having 
consultation 27.759 -4.531 0.341 782 
Accessibility of the health facility     
Patients visiting health center for curative care .499 -0.033 0.352 783 
Patients visiting health center for child curative care .266 -0.044 0.153 783 
Time in hours to come from the household to the 
health center  1.623 0.275 0.445 783 
% Patients pay transportation fees to come to the 
health center .07 -0.010 0.572 783 
% Patients used to this facility .817 -0.003 0.919 783 
Quality of the Service at the Health Facility     
% Patients considering the health agent "friendly" .634 -0.032 0.365 783 
%Patients considering they understand much better the 
disease .416 0.041 0.247 783 
% Patients satisfied by the visit in the health center .679 -0.050 0.141 783 
Cost for the service     
% Patient paying a fee for the consultation .559 -0.017 0.629 783 
Patient made a gift to health agent .015 0.012 0.244 783 
Consultation     
Length of consultation (minutes) 15.846 1.032 0.382 662 
Amount of the consultation fee paid by the patient 2503.609 32.048 0.939 782 
Coefficients from an Ordinary Least Square regression of the dependent variable on the treatment dummy and the urban 
dummy. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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